Abstract. This paper presents a type system which guarantees that well-typed programs in a procedural programming language satisfy a noninterference security property. With all program inputs and outputs classi ed at various security levels, the property basically states that a program output, classi ed at some level, can never change as a result of modifying only inputs classi ed at higher levels. Intuitively, this means the program does not \leak" sensitive data. The property is similar to a notion introduced years ago by Goguen and Meseguer to model security in multi-level computer systems 7]. We also give an algorithm for inferring and simplifying principal types, which document the security requirements of programs.
Introduction
This paper presents a type system for a procedural language that guarantees that well-typed programs respect the security levels of the variables they manipulate. More precisely, it guarantees that well-typed programs are noninterfering, which basically means that high-security inputs cannot a ect low-security outputs. Goguen and Meseguer introduced the idea of noninterference years ago as a notion of security for multi-level computing systems 7] ; this papers applies the notion to programming languages. Our type soundness theorem is a proof that every well-typed program has the noninterference property. The proof depends on two lemmas that, interestingly, turn out to be typing analogs of two properties known for years within the security community as the simple security property and the con nement property (also known as the -property). These are properties of the Bell and LaPadula model, developed in the early 70's as a model for multi-level security 4].
In an earlier work 17], we presented a type system to guarantee noninterference in a simple imperative language. In this work, we extend the analysis to a language with rst-order procedures, which can be used polymorphically with respect to security classes. Also, we address the type inference problem here.
We begin with an overview of the type system. Then we formally present the system and prove its soundness relative to a standard natural semantics.
In Section 6, we turn our attention to type inference and type simpli cation. Finally, we sketch some related e orts and some future research directions.
An Overview of the Type System
Noninterference was introduced as a model of security for multi-level computing systems 7] . The basic idea is that a system has users, some of whom supply high-level inputs and others who supply low-level inputs. Low-level users are only allowed to see low-level system outputs. (For the sake of simplifying the discussion, we shall consider only two security levels, low and high.) Such a system has the noninterference property if no matter how the high-level inputs change, the low-level system outputs remain the same.
The idea can also be applied to programming languages. Intuitively, the notion is that high-level program inputs can be altered without a ecting any lowlevel outputs. As a simple example, consider a procedure with just two formal parameters x and y: proc P(inout x : low; inout y : high); Here x and y are treated as variables with security levels low and high respectively. Suppose the calls P (u : low; v : high) and P (u : low; w : high) terminate with some nal values for u, v, and w. The nal values of v and w may di er. But if P is noninterfering, the nal value of u will be the same in both cases. Our type system guarantees that well-typed programs are noninterfering.
Types
The types of the system are strati ed into three levels. There are the types, which are the security levels, the types, which are the types of expressions and commands, and the types, which are the types of phrases. The security levels are assumed to be partially ordered by . For example, one might have low, high, trusted and untrusted such that low high and trusted untrusted. The relation is extended to a subtype relation over the phrase types.
Our phrase types are similar those of Forsythe 12] , except that our command types are parameterized. A command type has the form cmd; the intuition behind it is that a command c has this type only if every assignment in c is to a variable whose security level is or higher. So if a command has type high cmd, then it does not contain any assignments to low variables. Other phrase types are the types of variables, written var, and the types of acceptors, written acc. A variable of type var stores information whose security level is or lower. An acceptor is a write-only variable, used to type the out parameters of procedures.
A variable is implicitly dereferenced, so there is a rule for converting var to . Likewise, there is a rule for converting a variable type to an acceptor type, which is necessary in the left sides of assignments and in procedure calls involving out parameters. The subtype relation is contravariant in both command and acceptor types.
The Core Language and Typing Rules
The typed language is a core imperative language with procedures; however, procedures are not rst class values. Inspired by Denning's program certi cation rules 6], we have developed typing rules that ensure noninterference.
For instance, suppose that l and h are variables and that the identi er typing gives l type low var and gives h type high var. Then the assignment l := h must be rejected, since a change in the initial value of h will a ect the nal value of l. This is what Denning termed an explicit ow from h to l. So we introduce the following typing rule:
`e : acc; `e 0 : `e := e 0 : cmd This rule requires variables l and h in our example to agree on their security levels. Since they do not agree, even using subtyping, the assignment is rejected. On the other hand, h := l is accepted. Since low high, we can coerce the type of l from low to high to get agreement, allowing the assignment to be given type high cmd. Alternatively, we can coerce the type of h from high acc to low acc to give the assignment type low cmd.
It is worth pointing out that subtyping is neither covariant nor contravariant in variable types, because a variable is both an expression (which behaves covariantly) and an acceptor (which behaves contravariantly). Hence low var is unrelated to high var.
As 
A Formal Treatment of the Type System
The syntax of the core imperative language is given below.
(Phrase) p ::= e j c (Expr) e ::= x j n j l j e + e Meta-variable x ranges over identi ers, n ranges over integer literals and l ranges over locations, which are used in our language for input and output: the initial values of any locations in a program represent inputs, and the nal values of the locations represent outputs. (In addition, as will be seen in the natural semantics, evaluating a letvar causes a new location to be allocated, and later deallocated.) Also, we assume for simplicity that each procedure has exactly three parameters (one of each kind), and we use 0 for false and 1 for true. Finally, a phrase is closed if it has no free identi ers.
The types of the core language are strati ed as follows: ::= s ::= j proc( 1 ; 2 var; 3 acc) j cmd ::= j var j acc Meta-variable s ranges over a set of security levels, which is partially ordered by . The rules of the type system are given in Figure 1 . We omit typing rules for some compound expressions since they are similar to rule (sum). Notice that rule (int) allows an integer literal to be given every security level. Intuitively, a value is never intrinsically sensitive|it is sensitive only if it comes from a sensitive location. Note also that rule (letproc) allows procedures to be used polymorphically.The remaining rules of the type system constitute the subtyping logic and are given in Figure 2 .
In the typing judgment ; `p : , meta-variable ranges over identi er typings and over location typings. An identi er typing is a nite function mapping identi ers to types of the form , var or acc; (x) is the type assigned to x by , and x : ] is a modi ed identi er typing that assigns type to x and assigns type (x 0 ) to any identi er x 0 other than x. A location typing is a nite function mapping locations to types with similar notational conventions.
To facilitate the soundness proof, we introduce a syntax-directed set of typing rules. The rules of this system are just the rules of Figure 1 with rules (ident), (r-val), (assign), (if), and (while) replaced by their syntax-directed counterparts in Figure 3 . The subtyping rules in Figure 2 are not included in the syntax-directed system. We write judgments in the syntax-directed system as ; `s p : . The bene t of the syntax-directed system is that the last rule used in the derivation of a typing ; `s p : is uniquely determined by the form of p and of . It is also helpful in determining where coercions are needed during type inference.
Next we establish that the syntax-directed system is actually equivalent to our original system with respect to the types. First we need two lemmas: Lemma From now on, we shall assume that all typing derivations are done in the syntax-directed type system, and therefore shall take`to mean`s .
A Natural Semantics
We give a natural semantics for closed phrases. A closed phrase is evaluated relative to a memory , which is a nite function from locations to integers. The for the memory that assigns n to location l, and (l 0 ) to a location l 0 6 = l; thus l := n] is an update of if l 2 dom( ) and an extension of if l 6 2 dom( ).
Since expressions and commands are pure, our semantics uses `e ) n for the evaluation of an expression and `c ) The evaluation rules are given in Figure 4 . We write e 0 =x]e to denote the capture-avoiding substitution of e 0 for all free occurrences of x in e. Note the use of substitution in rules (call), (bindvar) and (bindproc); this allows us to avoid environments and closures in the semantics.
Type Soundness as Noninterference
In this section, we establish the semantic soundness of our type system by proving a noninterference theorem. Before proving soundness, we require some lemmas that establish useful properties of the type system and semantics. In the absence of procedures, this theorem can be proved directly 17]. Here, however, we prove the Noninterference Theorem as a corollary to the following theorem, whose proof is omitted due to space restrictions.
Lemma 4 (Expression Substitution
Theorem8. Suppose It is well known that polymorphic variables can easily break traditional forms of type soundness 16]. The same is true of a security type system. Giving a variable polymorphic type opens the door to \laundering". It would be possible to store high informationand retrieve it as something low. But soundness can also break in more subtle ways due to mutable objects, like variables and rst-class references, coupled with higher-order polymorphic procedures. It is interesting to note that if the core language were extended with these features, then existing techniques such as weak types 14] or limiting polymorphism to values 19] could be used to preserve soundness.
Type Inference
For the sake of describing type inference in this setting, we need to introduce extended types that can contain type variables ( , ,: : : ) in place of security levels. We use metavariables b , b , and b to range over extended types. Also, we use b to range over extended identi er typings that map identi ers to extended types; FTV (b ) gives the set of free type variables of b .
A type inference algorithm W , de ned by cases on the phrases of the language, is given in Figures 5 and 6 . It takes as input a location typing , an extended identi er typing b , a program phrase p, and a set V of type variables, which represents the set of \stale" type variables; this allows W to choose \fresh" type variables as necessary. If it succeeds, then it returns a set of at subtype inequalities C, an extended type b , and an updated set V We now establish the correctness of algorithm W . An instantiation I is a mapping from type variables to (ordinary) types. It can be applied, in the usual way, to extended types, to extended identi er typings, and to sets of inequalities among extended types. u t It follows from these theorems that we can check whether p is typable with respect to and by rst running W ( ; ; p; ;), and, if it succeeds with (C; b ; V ), then checking whether C is satis able with respect to the partial ordering of security levels. Checking the satis ability of a at set of subtyping inequalities with respect to a partial order has been studied previously 15, 18] . It is NPcomplete, in general, but can sometimes be done e ciently, for example, if the partial order is a disjoint union of lattices.
Principal Types
In addition to checking typability, type inference gives us the ability to compute principal types, that document all possible types of a program. We use constrained quanti cation 13] for our principal types:
::= 8 with C : b
In such a type scheme, the type variables can be instantiated only in ways that satisfy the subtype inequalities in C.
The instances of a type scheme are de ned as follows:
De nition12 (Instance). 8 which has no constraints at all. With type simpli cation, principal types become useful documentation of the security requirements of programs.
Related Work and Future Directions
One of the earliest e orts in the area is Denning's lattice model of secure information ow 5, 6] . Denning extended the work of Bell and LaPadula 4] by giving a secure-ow certi cation algorithm for programs. This early work has been followed by a variety of e orts dealing with secure information ow 2, 8, 3, 10, 11, 17] .
Some of these e orts 8, 10] have been aimed at proving the soundness of Denning's analysis. These e orts, however, prove soundness relative to an instrumented semantics whose validity is open to question. In contrast, we show the soundness of our analysis with respect to a standard natural semantics.
The work of Banâtre et al. 3] is similar in spirit to our work. They give a compile-time algorithm for detecting information ow in sequential programs, and they justify their algorithm in terms of a noninterference property. Their algorithm works by building a nal accessibility graph indicating whether the contents of one variable at some point in the program can ow into an instance of a variable at some other point. The drawback here is that the number of vertices in the nal accessibility graph is at least linear in the size of the program. This means that, unlike simpli ed principal types, nal graphs cannot serve as practical program documentation.
Palsberg and rb k 11] give a type system for trust analysis in the simplytyped calculus with a trust coercion. This (unsafe) coercion permits untrusted values to be explicitly coerced to trusted values. However, subject reduction is the only soundness property shown for their type system. It is unclear what one can say about the soundness of their system in terms of secure information ow.
The trust coercion certainly rules out our noninterference theorem.
Another recent type-based approach is Abadi's work on a version of the pi calculus, called spi, extended to express cryptographic protocols 1]. Also related is Necula and Lee's recent work on proof-carrying code 9].
In the future, it would be desirable to extend the core language considered here with a number of important features, including concurrency, networking, and exception handling. The impact of such features on the noninterference property needs to be investigated.
